Military Realism by Peter Campbell

Author:Peter Campbell [Campbell, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, General, Military, Strategy, United States
ISBN: 9780826274267
Google: H9WQDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: University of Missouri Press
Published: 2019-05-08T22:34:02+00:00

6

TRANSFORMING UNDER FIRE

The Global War on Terror, Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and Operations 2008

THIS FINAL CASE study chapter seeks to address the puzzle that gave birth to this work. How did a U.S. Army that had rejected counterinsurgency during and after Vietnam come to embrace it as a solution to recent conflicts? While this chapter examines the capstone manual of this period, Operations 2008, it is impossible to tell its story without also telling the story of the highly publicized Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Consequently, in addition to the usual structure, this chapter includes an extended discussion of the development of Field Manual 3-24, its relationship to ongoing operations, and, finally, the extent of its influence on Operations 2008. The chapter also briefly considers the decision to surge additional U.S. forces into Iraq to implement a new COIN strategy there.

In this final case, the behavior of the U.S. Army is more consistent with military realism than the other theoretical perspectives. For instance, regarding COIN doctrine, the U.S. Army did initially employ conventional warfare SOPs to fight the Iraqi insurgency, as organizational and cultural theories predict. However, senior army officers, both in the field and in the United States, soon recognized that they were facing an organized insurgency and needed to develop a counterinsurgency plan. A new COIN doctrine would be an integral part of that plan. Its senior leaders worked to capture the lessons of Iraq in two COIN manuals, the first in 2004 and the second in 2006. In addition, the rebirth of COIN was not a temporary aberration. COIN theory and experience from Iraq and Afghanistan heavily influenced Operations 2008. Thus, contrary to the predictions of military cultural and bureaucratic theories, the U.S. Army developed a COIN doctrine and allowed it to permeate its most important doctrinal manual.

This case study also presents strong evidence against the contention that civilian leaders imposed COIN on army commanders. Interestingly, army officers began to consider COIN for its post-9/11 conflicts years before civilian authorities. In fact, the army started these COIN innovations while civilian authorities were pushing it to avoid nation building and focus instead on developing high-tech, conventional forces. Even though these civilian initiatives were in line with the supposed preferences of army culture and bureaucracy, the army developed a COIN doctrine and, more surprising still, made COIN a central part of its capstone doctrine.

This is not to say army doctrine in this period focused exclusively on COIN. Operations 2008 kept many of the doctrinal concepts for conventional forces from previous doctrine. The main mission of the army continued to be power projection supported by new technologies, which would make the force light enough to project but strong enough to fight. The army underwent significant organizational changes in this period in an attempt to make this force a reality. However, these attempts met with serious setbacks that forced the army to reconsider its attempt to transform itself. There was also a recognition that conventional, offensive operations did not necessarily lead to decisive victory.

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